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U.S. Sentencing Commission Economic
Crime Symposium
Editor's Note: On October12-13, 2000, the U.S. Sentencing Commission sponsored its Third Symposium On Crime and
Punishment in the United States: FederalSentencing Policy for Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses. The afternoon of the first day of the meeting was devoted to discussing the concept of "loss" as a measurement of defendant culpability
and offense seriousness. The conferees were divided into small groups to discuss discrete sub-issues relating to "loss" and its
place in sentencing economic crimes under the Guidelines. Following the small group discussions, the discussion leaders
('facilitators") addressed a plenary session of the conference to report on the conclusions drawn by their groups. In an effort
to capture the essence of an afternoon ofwide-ranging discussion, we have reproduced two documents here:first,a condensed
version of a briefingpaperprovided to the small groupfacilitatorsby the Sentencing Commission prior to the conference,
and second, a transcriptof the plenary session at which the facilitatorsreported the conclusions reached by theirgroups.

Briefing Paper on Problems In Redefining "Loss"

FRANK 0.

This paper begins with a description of the general
principles at issue when discussing the place of "loss" in
setting punishments for economic crime. It then focuses
on the sub-issues assigned to the breakout groups.

* The relevant conduct guideline, IBi.3, mandates a
broad measurement of harm, saying that offense
levels are to be determined based on "all harms
resulting from" a defendant's own conduct, and thus
apparently sets up a rule of pure "but for" causation.
* By contrast, both the fraud and theft guidelines
define "loss" narrowly as the "thing taken," the corpus delicti of the crime.
* Moreover, S2FI.i, Note 8(c), says only "direct damages" count, and excludes "consequential damages."
Both these terms are drawn from contract law and
are difficult, if not impossible, to apply in the criminal context. If "consequential damages" is given its
customary contract law meaning, Note 8(c) excludes
from "loss" even economic harms which were
directly caused by defendant's conduct and foreseeable by him at the time he committed the crime.
* On the other hand, in cases of procurement fraud and
product substitution, 2F1.s, Note 8(c), specifically
includes in "loss" the "consequential damages"
elsewhere excluded, if the loss is "foreseeable."
* Likewise, under the relevant conduct rules, SiBI. 3 , if
a defendant has co-conspirators or other criminal
cohorts, he is responsible for all harms that resulted
from all of their "reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions" in furtherance of the crime.
* In loan fraud cases, pursuant to 52Fi.i, Note 8(b),
the loss to banks caused by a drop in value of
pledged collateral between the making of the loan
and the date of sentencing is a part of the "loss,"
regardless of whether decline was foreseeable and
despite the fact that such a loss is a classic "consequential damage."
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I. The Definition and Role of "Loss" Under the
Current Guidelines
The amount of "loss" is the primary determinant of a
defendant's sentence for economic offenses sentenced
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under Section 2BI.I and 2Fi.I of the Guidelines. The
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root of the "loss" problem is that the Guidelines do not
now contain a meaningful definition of the term. The
commentary following Sections 2BI.I and 2FI.I

includes a series of directives which neither singly nor
together amount to a coherent definition. In the first
place, the basic definition of "loss" - "the value of the
property taken, damaged, or destroyed" - uses the language of larceny. The word "taken" is a term of art,
denoting the "taking" element of common law larceny,
with its insistence on a transfer of possession of moveable personalty. Outside the context of simple larcenylike offenses, this definition is virtually useless. For
example, when is property "taken" in a wire fraud or a
bankruptcy fraud or an insider trading case, and how,
and from whom?
Aside from the larceny-based core definition, perhaps the most glaring defect in the current "loss" rules
is their treatment of causation. When we ask what the
"loss" is in any particular case, we are really asking two
questions about causation: First, what economic harms
resulted from defendant's conduct? Second, which
among the harms the defendant caused in fact should
count in law in setting his sentence? The guidelines
relating to these questions and the cases construing
them have created an ugly and nearly incomprehensible patchwork, which so far as can be discerned, looks
roughly like this:
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II. Breakout Groups 1 and 2: Arriving at a Core
Definition of Actual Loss-Causation and Related
Issues
In general, the criminal law imposes punishment when
a defendant has been found culpable either for causing
or intending to cause harm to another person or to society. The seriousness of a criminal offense is the product
of several factors, including the degree of harm caused
or intended, the culpable mental state of the defendant,
and (in the case of completed offenses) the causal relationship between the defendant's actions and the harm
caused. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines impose
increasing levels of punishment as the "Offense Level"
(a numerical measurement of offense seriousness)
increases. In economic crimes, the type of harm caused
or intended is customarily pecuniary, though other
types of harm can result from predominantly economic
crime. Consequently, the largest component in the
Offense Level calculation for economic crimes is "loss."
The "loss" figure is designed to serve as the primary
measure of offense seriousness in economic crimes. It
performs its role in slightly different ways depending
on whether the crime was a completed offense, a partially completed offense, or a wholly inchoate offense
such as an attempt or unsuccessful conspiracy. In completed offenses, "loss" provides both a direct measurement of harm to victims and a proxy measurement of
the defendant's culpable mental state. In inchoate
offenses, "intended loss" serves as a direct measurement of culpable mental state and as an important indicator of the degree of risk of actual harm posed by the
defendant's conduct. Whatever the context, however, it
is fair to say that "loss" is, first and foremost, a quantitative measurement of the pecuniary harm the defendant
either caused or intended.
A. Causation
In general, stealing more is worse than stealing less,
and should be punished more severely. First, the larger
the victim's economic loss, the greater the harm
caused. Second, a defendant who steals a large amount
is usually thought to be more blameworthy than one
who steals only a small sum, both because the intention to cause a large harm is more blameworthy than an
intention to cause a smaller one, and because, in general, a successful scheme to steal a large amount
involves longer planning and premeditation. Therefore,
in completed offenses, a larger "loss" should, in general, be punished more severely than a smaller "loss."
This simple equivalency becomes more complex,
however, in cases where the defendant's criminal conduct caused economic harms which the defendant did
not desire, or from which he did not personally benefit.
For example, a defendant in a fraudulent loan application case, confident that his "ship would come in" in
time to make repayment, may not have intended that
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the bank lose its loan money. Or the author of a telemarketing scheme might not intend that his elderly victims lose their homes as a result of loss of retirement
savings to the telemarketer. In these and other cases,
whether the defendant is to be held culpable for particular economic losses to victims, and thus whether the
"loss" number and perhaps his offense level may be
increased, will depend on the legal question of causation. In other words, was the causal link between the
defendant's conduct and the economic harm that
resulted sufficiently direct that the law should hold the
defendant responsible and increase his punishment
accordingly?
The literature of criminal law, contracts, and torts
usually conceives of causation problems as having two
components, customarily labeled "cause-in-fact" and
legal cause. Cause-in-fact is about determining the
causal relationship between a defendant's act and a
subsequent harm to another. It asks whether the conduct truly was a part of the chain of events in the physical world that brought about the harm. Legal cause asks
a different question: Assuming that the defendant's
conduct truly did play a role in bringing about the
harm, is it just to impose legal liability for the harm
concededly caused? For example, a hiker who dislodges
a pebble on a mountainside may start an avalanche that
obliterates a village below. Cause-in-fact is concerned
only with the issue of whether the dislodged pebble
started the avalanche. Legal cause is about whether,
assuming that the pebble did cause the slide, the hiker
should, as a matter of law and social policy, be held
accountable and punished for the destruction of the village and the death of the villagers.
In both civil and criminal law, the most common
causation standard is "reasonable foreseeability." To a
certain extent, the familiar reasonable foreseeability
standard mushes together the analytically distinct questions of cause-in-fact and legal cause. That is, under a
reasonable foreseeability standard, a defendant will be
held civilly liable or criminally culpable for harms that
(i) were caused in fact by defendant's conduct, in the
sense that they would not have occurred but for defendant's conduct, and (2) were, at the time of defendant's
illegal conduct, foreseeable to a reasonable person in
defendant's position. At present, the Guidelines do not
address the issue of causation of loss, except indirectly
through the relevant conduct guideline, iBi. 3 , and by
inclusion of the contracts term "consequential damages"in Section 2Fi.i, Note 8(c). For the past several
years, the Sentencing Commission, in consultation
with outside groups such as the Judicial Conference,
the Justice Department, and the defense bar has been
working on a redefinition of actual loss that would be
cause-based. This redefinition would contain a causation standard for actual loss under the Guidelines
expressing the idea that defendants should be held
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that now appears in the fraud loss definition. Some
have argued that the general exclusion of "consequential damages" from loss in Application Note 8 is desirable because it limits the scope of actual loss to the
harms most directly connected to a defendant's misconduct. Others have contended that the interjection of a
term drawn from contract law into a rule of criminal
sentencing is, at the very least, extraordinarily confusing. Moreover, if the term "consequential damages" is
given its normal legal meaning, excluding such "damages" from loss means excluding harms that were
caused in fact by the defendant and were entirely foreseeable to the defendant.' Facilitators may wish to discuss whether some of the concerns about overbreadth
of a cause-based loss definition can be addressed by
special rules expressly excluding from "loss" certain
commonly occurring foreseeable harms - such as
interest and the costs to the government of investigating the crime.

responsible for harms that would not have occurred
but for a defendant's conduct and that were reasonably
foreseeable to him.
B. Questions on Causation for Groups One and Two
1. Should the core definition of "loss" be based on
principles of causation?
The first question for Groups One and Two is whether
the core definition of "loss" in completed economic
crimes should be cause-based, and if so, whether the
standard should be reasonable foreseeability. Facilitators may wish to explore whether some alternative noncausation-based definition of actual loss would be
feasible and desirable. Likewise, facilitators might wish
to consider whether standards of causation either narrower or broader than reasonable foreseeability would
be more desirable. For example, one might eliminate
the legal cause component of the definition altogether
and hold defendants responsible for all harms that
would not have occurred but for their criminal conduct,
regardless of whether those harms were foreseeable to
the defendant. Conversely, one might decide to hold a
defendant responsible only for those harms that he
intended and that were caused in fact by his criminal
conduct.
In discussing the issue of causation, facilitators may
also wish to consider that it is possible to limit legal liability for harms, not only by changing the standard of
legal cause (e.g., tightening the definition of "foreseeability"), but also by imposing a stricter than "but for"
definition of cause-in-fact. One can, for example,
require that the defendant's harm be a "substantial factor" in causing the harm, rather than merely one factor
contributing to causing the harm.'
Second, facilitators in Groups i and 2 may wish to
consider whether actual loss should be limited to pecuniary harms caused by defendants' misconduct, or
whether non-economic harms such as emotional distress should be "monetized" and included in loss. That
is, should courts attempt to assign monetary values to
non-economic harms caused by economic crimes (as
courts and juries do routinely in civil lawsuits) and
include the resulting figures in loss?
Finally, Groups i and 2 will doubtless wish to
address the question of whether a reasonable foreseeability standard for actual loss would sweep too broadly.
Would such a standard include within "loss" harms for
which a defendant ought not be punished? Would such
a standard confer desirable discretion on district court
judges to determine the harms that ought and ought
not be considered for sentencing purposes? Or would it
require hearings on issues tangential to the core concers of sentencing? In considering these questions,
facilitators in Groups s and 2 may wish to address the
issues raised by the phrase "consequential damages"
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2. Should interest be included in the amount of
"loss"?
The question of whether interest should be included in
the "loss" amount is a special instance of the general
causation problem. The Guidelines now exclude interest from "loss."
Application Note 8 to 12FI.1 says that loss "does not
...
include interest the victim could have earned on
such funds had the offense not occurred." Nonetheless,
several courts of appeals have (depending on one's
point of view) either simply ignored the Guidelines or
interpreted them creatively in order to include "bargained for" interest in loss., There are three possible
approaches to dealing with interest: (i) exclude all interest, including both bargained-for and opportunity cost
interest, (2) include interest or some other measure of
the time value of the money or property stolen from the
victim in all cases, or (3) include "bargained for" interest, but exclude all other interest and opportunity costs.
a. Arguments for Inclusion of Interest
Consistency with the core definition of loss suggests
inclusion of interest. If a criminal steals money that the
victim would otherwise have loaned to or invested with
an honest person or institution, it is reasonably foreseeable that the victim will lose not only his principal, but
also the time value of that money. Loss of the time value
of money is, from an economic point of view, indisputably a "harm" suffered by the victim of a fraud. But
the consistency argument proves too much. If we are
going to include in "loss" the time value of stolen
money, then consistency dictates that we include time
value not only when the defendant defrauds a victim by
promising payment of "interest," but also when he
promises a return on investment in the form of"dividends," "capital gains," or "profits." A defendant's sen-
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tence should not turn on the fortuity of the name used
to characterize the promised return on investment.
Likewise, a victim suffers the harm of lost time value of
his money even if the scheme is one that involves no
promise of return on investment. For example, an
insurance company defrauded by an insured who
torches his own business and then collects fire insurance proceeds is deprived of the time value of the insurance payout no less than it would be if the company
had lost the same amount by investing it with a crooked
stock broker who falsely promised a high rate of return.
As noted above, several courts have sought to evade
the current prohibition against including interest in
"loss" by including interest specifically promised by a
defendant as part of the inducement to the victim to
part with his money, so-called "bargained-for interest."
Objections to the position of these courts include:
First, "loss" is a measurement of actual harm actually suffered by the victim, not of the magnitude of the
false promises of the crooked defendant. If a defendant
defrauded Victim A by promising payment of io%
interest monthly, A's "actual loss" is not his principal
plus 12o% annual interest because there was never a realistic possibility that the defendant or anyone else would pay
him interest at that rate. The only reliable measure of
what the victim lost by giving his money to the defendant rather than investing it with an honest person is
the market rate for invested money.
Second, using the interest rate promised by defendants creates a disparity of punishment between similarly situated defendants. Three defendants who stole
the same amount of money should not receive different
sentences merely because the first falsely promised his
victims a 5o% return, the second promised soo%, and
the third committed a form of fraud (like the arsonist
who defrauded his fire insurer in the example above)
that involved no promise of return on investment.
Third, using different interest rates in every case
adds to sentencing complexity. There will be inevitable
disputes over exactly what rate of return was promised.
And, particularly in multi-victim fraud cases, it will
often prove that the defendant promised different rates
of return to different victims. In such cases, the court
would have to make findings about exactly what was
promised each of perhaps dozens or hundreds of victims.
One idea that may lie behind the "bargained for"
interest cases is the notion that the magnitude of the
defendant's false promises is somehow a proxy measurement for the defendant's blameworthiness. But this
is a false equivalency. A crook who eucres a victim out
of $i,ooo by falsely promising a io% monthly return is
by no rational calculation either more or less blameworthy than another crook who inveigles the same victim
into parting with the same $i,ooo with a false promise
of a i5% monthly return. The harm to the victim in
both cases is the same, and the true measure of each
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defendant's blameworthiness is his settled desire to
cheat the victim of $Si,ooo,rather than the particular
false promises he makes in his efforts to do so. In short,
it has been argued that among the competing proposals
regarding interest, the "bargained for" interest option is
the least desirable of the lot.
b. Arguments for total exclusion of interest
One can argue that interest should be excluded from
"loss" altogether. Including interest introduces all the
problems of equity between defendants and complexity
of calculation just discussed, but it does little to make
"loss" a more accurate measure of relative offense seriousness. In the view of those who favor a total exclusion
of interest, it is difficult to see why courts should
expend valuable resources on quantifying interest as an
element of loss when the result of the labor advances
the purposes of sentencing so little.
Another argument in favor of excluding both "interest" and opportunity costs from loss is that such an
exclusion goes some distance toward meeting a central
objection to defining "loss" in terms of causation - that
doing so may result in including too many peripheral
economic harms. Excluding all interest and opportunity
costs, as well as the government's investigative costs,
would eliminate many of the peripheral harms that
would be likely to cause dispute and delay in the sentencing process.
3. Group 2: Do problems of multiple causation need
to be addressed in a loss definition?
The issue of multiple causation commonly arises when
a defendant's conduct has plainly caused some actual
loss to the victim, but the defense claims the loss would
have been smaller or nonexistent but for the intervention of factors unforeseen by the defendant. Consider,
for example, a victim who purchases stock based on a
defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations about the
value of the stock, and then sees the stock decrease in
value still further because of an unforeseen downturn
in the stock market after the purchase. From one point
of view, the only loss directly caused by the defendant in
this case is the difference between the price the victim
paid for the stock based on the representations by the
defendant and the actual (lower) market value of the
stock at the time of purchase., On the other hand, but
for the defendant's blandishments, the victim would
not have been holding the stock to begin with and thus
would not have suffered the additional harm caused by
the market decline. The fundamental issue is the
nature and strength of the required causal nexus
between a defendant's criminal conduct and the "loss"
charged to him under the guidelines.
The Guidelines now provide somewhat conflicting
advice on how this problem should be approached. The
only direct reference to the issue of multiple causation
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in either the theft or fraud guidelines is in Application
Note 8(b) OfS2Fi.i. There it is suggested that the amount
of "loss" which was caused by the defendant's conduct
may overstate the seriousness of his offense if there
existed some cause or causes extraneous to the defendant's misbehavior. The example given is an unanticipated economic event like a grain embargo. In such
a case, the suggested remedy is a downward departure.
By contrast, the very same Application Note 8(b) says
that loss in fraudulent loan cases will be determined
by taking the unpaid balance of the loan at the time
of discovery of the fraud and subtracting the amount
the "lending institution has recovered (or can expect to
recover)" from liquidation of the collateral. The commentary does not exclude from the loss calculation the
increase in "loss" which necessarily occurs any time
the value of pledged collateral has decreased due to
changed market conditions, natural disasters, or other
factors arising between the making of the loan and the
liquidation of the collateral after discovery of the fraud.
Where the victim is a bank, the defendant is responsible
for the bank's whole loss, multiple factors or no.
No guidance is given on the question of when losses
arising from external factors should be attributed to the
defendant and when the connection between the external factor, the defendant's conduct, and the victim's
loss is so attenuated that some adjustment should be
made by actual modification of the loss amount or by
departure. Courts have wrestled with this problem with
indifferent success. Some appear to recognize that
adjustments to "loss" for multiple causation may be
appropriate in certain cases.5 On the other hand, the
Third Circuit is of the view that multiple causation can
only be a ground for a downward departure.'
Group 2 may wish to discuss whether a core definition
of actual loss based on reasonable foreseeability resolves
the question of how to deal with multiple causation, or
whether some additional provision specifically dealing
with cases of multiple causation is desirable.
Ill. Breakout Groups 3, 4, & 5: Is "loss" a gross or
net concept? If net, what crediting rules should be
adopted?
A. "Net" vs. "Gross" Loss: The Problem of Credits
Against Loss
1. Current law
Under current law, the general rule is that actual loss
under S1FI.i is the net loss to the victim. The fraud
guideline requires that any loss suffered by a fraud victim be offset by any value received in the transaction.
Application Note 8(a) to S2Fi.i states:
A fraud may involve the misrepresentation of the
value of an item that does have some value (in contrast to an item that is worthless). Where, for
example, a defendant fraudulently represents that
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stock is worth $40,000 and the stock is worth only
$io,ooo, the loss is the amount by which the stock
is overvalued (i.e. $30,000). In a case involving a
misrepresentation concerning the quality of a consumer product, the loss is the difference between
the amount paid by the victim for the product and
the amount for which the victim could resell the
product received.
The courts have made clear that the Guidelines'
insistence on a measurement of net detriment to the
victim is not limited to cases involving misrepresentation of the value of goods. As the Tenth Circuit has
observed, in determining actual loss, "only net loss is
considered; anything received from the defendant in
return reduces the actual loss.",
The same net loss rule applies in check kiting
schemes. The proper measurement of "loss" in a check
kiting case is the actual loss to the victim bank measured at the time the kite is detected. A rule denying
"credits" for money returned to the victim in the course
of a kiting scheme would require the sentencing court
to add up the face amounts of all the dozens or hundreds of checks that passed through the kited accounts,
without subtracting the deposits into the kited
accounts. In short, a "gross loss" rule would generate an
"actual loss" dozens or hundreds of times larger than
the actual amount of money the victim bank really lost.
The courts have uniformly rejected such an approach!
The prevailing general rule is that actual loss is net
loss. However, some courts have been reluctant to
reduce loss in theft or embezzlement cases where a
defendant completed the offense and deprived the victim of money or property, but returned some or all of
the money or property before the offense was discovered. 9 More commonly, disputes have arisen in fraud
cases over whether in some circumstances the value of
money or property conveyed to victims as part of the
fraudulent scheme should be deducted from the loss
amount.
2. Net vs. gross loss
Groups 3, 4, and 5 should address the basic question of
whether loss is a net or gross concept. If "loss" is primarily a measurement of economic harm to victims, it
seems hard to escape the conclusion that loss should
measure the net economic deprivation of the victim(s).
However, facilitators may wish to explore whether this
conclusion is really so compelling as it seems. In
assessing the desirability of the current general rule,
one might consider whether there is a difference,
both in terms of culpability and of the victim's fiscal
bottom line, between:
(i) a man who steals my wallet containing $io,ooo;
(ii) a man who convinces me to give him $io,ooo in
exchange for stock he knows to be worth $5,ooo;
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(iii) a man who convinces me to give him $io,ooo in
exchange for his promise to pay me $13,ooo next
Tuesday, but actually pays me only $8,ooo (hoping
that this payment will be sufficient to prevent me
from going to the police); and
(iv) a man who lies about his assets and convinces me
to loan him $Io,ooo in exchange for an unfulfilled
promise to repay the money with interest, collateralized by a security interest in real property worth
$9,000.
In each case, the defendant receives $io,ooo of my
money, but most of us would agree that my loss in the
first case is $so,ooo, in the second case $5,000, in the
third case $2,000, and in the fourth case $i,ooo. How
should a rule on loss and credits against loss account
for these and other commonly occurring situations?
B. Group 3: Regulatory crimes
Some of the knottiest problems presented by the net
versus gross loss debate are illustrated by cases in
which defendants evaded FDA regulatory processes in
bringing drugs to market. In one case, United States v.
Chattei,o the defendant provided false information to
the FDA to gain approval of a drug. In another, United
States v.Haas," the defendant purchased drugs in Mexico for sale in the U.S., thus bypassing FDA controls. In
both cases, the defendant sold drugs that were equally
effective as those approved by the FDA. However, in
Chatterji, the Fourth Circuit found no economic harm
and therefore no loss,"2 while in Haas,the Fifth Circuit
found no economic harm, but sentenced the defendant
based on his gain. A similar problem was presented in
United States v.Maurello," where the Third Circuit held
that a defendant convicted of mail fraud for deceiving
clients by practicing law without a license must be
credited in the loss calculation for the value of satisfactory legal services rendered.
Some observers are of the view that those who place
consumers at risk by evading regulatory processes for
drugs and other products and services should receive
significant sentences. The difficulty is that the "loss"
mechanism for measuring offense seriousness does not
account very well for economic and non-economic
harm (such as physical injury or illness that might
result from taking inefficacious unapproved drugs) that
is risked, but does not actually occur. Group 3 may wish
to explore questions such as:
Did the consumers in the drug and professional services cases suffer any "loss," in the sense of a
quantifiable economic harm?
Was the government or the public the true victim of
this conduct? How should any injury to the government or the public be accounted for? Is the "loss"
mechanism the best way of doing so? Ought cases of
this type to be sentenced under a separate guideline?
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Should the guidelines treat risk of harm as equivalent to actual harm? Should a risk be treated more
seriously where a defendant consciously evaded regulatory controls created precisely for the purpose of
reducing that risk?
Could these cases be sentenced within the fraud
guideline by employing the defendants' "gain" as a
substitute measure for "loss"? Or would using gain
in these cases distort the fraud guidelines?
C. Group 4: Crediting rules in investment fraud cases
and for items of de minimis value
1. Investment fraud cases
Courts have adopted three different approaches to credits for amounts returned to the victims of investment
schemes with more than one victim (such as so-called
"Ponzi schemes") in which the defendant repays money
to early victims in order to continue the scheme or
avoid detection. Four circuits have held that payments
made to Ponzi scheme victims are not deductible from
the "loss" figure at all.'" The theory of these cases is that
a defendant should receive no credit for such payments
because they are a necessary part of the scheme
designed to gain the investors' confidence in order to
secure additional investments and to forestall discovery
of the scheme. The Seventh Circuit considers the victims as a class and takes a net loss approach; the loss is
the amount taken from the class of victims by the
defendant minus the amount given back to the class of
victims by the defendant. I" The Eleventh Circuit has
taken a middle ground, adopting a "loss to the losing
investors" approach. Under this theory, the loss is the
total amount lost by those victims who were out money
at the time of the scheme's discovery. Those investors
who received repayments in excess of their original
investment are not considered "victims" at all. Therefore, their windfalls are not counted towards reducing
the losses of other investors.
The position of those courts that refuse to give credit
for any payments to early investors is troublesome on
both interpretive and policy grounds. First, giving no
credit for repayments seems to run contrary to the basic
"net loss" approach endorsed by 2FI.I, Application
Notes 8(a) and 8(b). Second, because the function of
the loss figure is to measure economic harm to victims,
it must distinguish between greater and lesser harms.
A scheme in which a defendant takes and keeps
$io,ooo causes more economic harm than one in
which the defendant takes $io,ooo, but gives back
$5,ooo. Third, the rationale for this exception to the
basic net loss rule - that defendants deserve no credit
for payments made solely to perpetuate the scheme when taken to its logical conclusion would swallow the
rule and eliminate virtually all credits. No defendant
truly bent on fraud confers benefits on his victims out
of benevolence or a sense of sound commercial ethics.
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The argument in favor of a time-of-detection rule
(which seems to have been adopted by the majority of
circuits for at least some kinds of cases'6 ) can be summarized as follows: Once a crime is discovered by its
victims, they can take steps to prevent further losses.
Likewise, once a crime is detected, defendants will ordinarily stop their criminal behavior, either because they
have been arrested or because they fear arrest and do
not wish to make their punishment worse. Thus, in the
ordinary case, the time of detection will be the point of
maximum loss. Even though losses may sometimes
continue to accrue after detection up until sentencing
despite the cessation of a defendant's active criminal
efforts, there is far too great a potential for arbitrariness
in measuring loss at the date of sentencing. If defendants were credited with repayments made after detection, but before sentencing, the rich (or those who had
not yet spent their criminal earnings) could buy themselves out of prison time. Conversely, defendants
should not have to spend more time in prison because
losses mount while the government or the court delays
a prosecution or sentencing.
It is also critical that rules governing when loss
should be measured provide coherent guidance about
when so-called "credits" against loss (such as victim
repayments and posted collateral) are to be valued. The
importance, and the difficulties, of drafting a good time
of measurement rule for credit are illustrated by a proposal now on the table in the May 1999 Sentencing
Commission staff draft loss redefinition." This draft
would seem to require that: (a) loss be measured at the
time of detection, but (b) that the value of collateral to be
credited against loss be valued when liquidated or at the
time of sentencing,whichever came first, and (c) that all
other things of value transferred by a defendant to a victim and credited against loss be valued at the time of
transfer. It can fairly be argued that the May 1999 Draft
violates the principle that a good time-of-measurement
rule should - with the absolute minimum number of
exceptions - provide for measuring the value of what
the defendant stole and the value of any credits against
that value at the same point in time.
Moreover, valuing credits at the time of transfer to
the victim might well: (a) prove terribly cumbersome in
many multi-victim or multi-transaction cases, and (b)
produce substantively erroneous and unfair results in
certain cases. Consider, for example, a defendant who
makes an initial stock offering in the penny stock market, and makes inflated and untrue claims in the
prospectus. Hundreds of victims buy the stock over a
six month period, during which time the stock steadily
gains in value. At the end of the six month period, the
defendant's falsehoods come to light and the value of
the stock plunges to zero. In such a case, not only
would the proposed "valuation at time of transfer" rule
require the court to determine the fluctuating price of

Any swindler who can will steal without incurring any
overhead. Thus, almost all payments and transfers by
defendants to victims are made in some sense to further
the success of the scheme. Nonetheless, a defendant
who steals $5o,ooo and gives nothing in return causes
a greater social harm than one who takes $5o,ooo, but
gives back $40,000. It would seem that in investment
fraud schemes as elsewhere, the difference in harm
caused should be reflected in the sentence imposed.
The Seventh Circuit's approach of considering the
net loss to the victim investors as a class is likewise
questionable because windfalls bestowed on early
investors in a Ponzi scheme do nothing to reduce the
harm inflicted on later investors left holding the bag.
The Eleventh Circuit's "loss to the losing victims"
approach to multi-victim fraud schemes may represent
the most sensible approach to the loss measurement
problem in investment cases.
2. Items of "little or no value" because "substantially
different" than the thing promised
In its May '999 draft of a proposed loss redefinition,
the Commission staff proposed excluding from "loss"
things transferred to victims by defendants if the thing
"has little or no value to the victim because it is substantially different from what the defendant or persons
acting jointly with the defendant led the victim to
expect." This proposal had its genesis in Justice Department concerns about the nearly worthless items sent by
telemarketers in place of the items promised - $5 plastic radios in place of the promised "stereo system,"
common coins in place of the "rare collectibles"
promised, etc. The Department was understandably
concerned about two points: (i) that such junk confers
no real economic benefit on the persons receiving it,
and thus should not reduce a defendant's punishment,
and (2) that calculating the value of the stuff is, at best,
a nuisance. Facilitators in Group 4 may wish to explore
whether some exclusion from credits against loss for
items of de minimis value is appropriate, and if so, how
such an exclusion should be phrased.
D. Group 5: Time of Measurement
Critical to any coherent and workable definition of
"loss" is a rule for determining when loss should be
measured. The timing of the loss measurement may be
crucial in determining the value of the "thing taken" if
its value fluctuates. Timing rules are essential in deciding how to measure loss from a continuing and complex course of conduct like a check kite. Likewise, the
time of measurement will influence whether credits
against loss will be given for payments or repayments
to victims. In theory, "loss" could be measured at any
one of a number of points, including the time the crime
is legally complete, the time of detection, or the time of
sentencing.
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the bogus stock on every date on which there was a purchase, but it would produce the absurd result that the
victims would be found to have no "loss" at all. Since the
amount of money the victims paid to the defendant
would be offset by a credit for the market value of the
stock on the date of transfer,by definition the "loss"
would be zero.
The only way around this zero-loss result is to argue
that the "real" value of the transferred property at the
time of the transfer was not its then-current market
price, but the value it would have had if full information
had been available. But this is nothing more than a
roundabout way of saying that the value of transferred
property in such cases is actually its value at the time of
detection of the crime. So why not adopt that rule in the
first place?
Group 5 may also wish to discuss the valuation of
pledged collateral. At present, such collateral is valued
at either the amount obtained by the victim through
foreclosure and liquidation, or if these events have not
yet occurred by sentencing, at the fair market value at
the time of sentencing. There are those who argue that
ease of administration and continuity with existing
practice, should result in retaining this limited exception to the general timing rule.

those in which the defendant's objectives were either
impossible or improbable for some other, usually
economic, reason. Facilitators should considers two
types of cases.
"Sting operations": Defendants caught by govemment undercover operations before they can steal any
money commonly argue that the intended loss provision of 2F1.I, Note 8, should not apply to them
because no actual loss was possible. The majority of the
circuits to have addressed the question reject this argument and treat fraud cases no differently than drug
cases or other "stings" in which success is foreclosed by
the defendant's choice of confederate.'8 The Tenth Circuit, however, has taken a different view, holding that
where the defendant is dealing with a government
agent and no money changes hands, there is no loss.'9
Economic reality: Some courts require the court to
determine whether it was realistically possible for
defendant to inflict the intended loss." This position
has been characterized as the "economic reality" doctrine.' The majority of courts hold that it does not matter whether the intended loss was realistically
possible." However, the Seventh Circuit has suggested
that the improbability of an intended loss might be a
proper basis for a downward departure." 3

IV. Groups 6 and 7: Intended Loss & Gain
A. Partially complete or inchoate offenses (attempts,
conspiracies, and the like)
Under current Guidelines, actual loss is the primary
measurement of offense seriousness for completed economic crimes. It does not, however, assist in ranking
offense seriousness for economic crimes which are
either wholly or partially incomplete, such as attempts
or unsuccessful conspiracies. If a defendant conspires
to steal or defraud, but is caught in the act, an economic
crime guideline that measured only actual loss could
not differentiate between a scheme to steal $i million
and a scheme to shoplift a box of candy bars.
The present Guidelines rank the seriousness of
inchoate economic crimes by focusing on a defendant's
intent and providing that the "loss" figure used in calculating the offense level will be the greater of the actual
or intended harm. Groups 6 and 7 should consider
whether the intended loss measurement should be
retained in order to facilitate the ranking of wholly
inchoate or partially uncompleted crimes. In addition,
the following sub-issues arise:

2. Should intended loss count less than actual loss?
Ordinarily, the criminal law punishes defendants less
severely for uncompleted crime and unconsumated
harms than for completed crime and harms actually
inflicted. For example, sentences for attempt crimes are
customarily, if not invariably, less serious than sentences for the same completed offenses. As now structured, the Guidelines give the same weight to intended
loss as it does to actual loss. Facilitators in Group 6
should consider how, if at all, the Guidelines should
"discount" intended loss as against actual loss.

1. What about intended loss that is factually
impossible or improbable?
There is a difference of opinion as to whether the
intended loss must be realistic. This question arises in
two types of cases - those involving government "sting"
operations where no loss was possible because the
defendant was dealing with government agents, and
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B. Group 7: The problem of "gain"
It has been argued that the concept of "gain" is
superfluous in a properly drafted loss guideline because
"gain" is unnecessary if the victims of defendant's conduct are accurately identified.- Even if this is generally
true, cases do exist in which calculation of loss on a victim-by-victim basis is impracticable, but calculation of
defendant's gain is readily achievable and represents a
reasonable approximation of the harm to the victims as
a class. Therefore, it may be desirable to make gain
available as a means of approximating loss in such
cases. Facilitators in Group 7 should discuss the desirability of the use of gain for this purpose.
It has also been suggested, as for example in the
May 1999 draft, that gain should be used "insteadof
loss" where "gain is greater than loss and more accurately reflects the seriousness of the offense." This
approach presents several difficulties. First, it is difficult
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to imagine a case in which gain was actually greater
than loss. If a defendant's gain is simply the value of the
money or property the defendant gets from the victim
without any reduction for the defendant's costs, then
gain exactly equals loss. If, as several participants in the
"loss" debate have suggested, the gain calculation
should be "net," that is the amount the defendant
retained from the crime after his expenses, then gain is,
by definition, less than loss. All undertakings, even
purely criminal ones, have some overhead costs. Moreover, all of the proposals currently under consideration
define loss as including reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered by the victim in consequence of
the defendant's criminal conduct. Such foreseeable
harms may make loss larger than gain, because loss
will include economic deprivations to the victims that
do not necessarily benefit the defendant. However,
under these proposals a defendant's pecuniary gain will
never be larger than the pecuniary loss.
Second, using gain as loss in a case where gain
exceeds loss (assuming that it could) gives gain an independent significance. There is no theoretical problem
with using gain as an alternate measure of loss when
defendant's gain is known to be less than the victims'
loss, but the loss is itself difficult to determine with
specificity. In such a case, we are merely conceding that
we cannot as a practical matter discover the entire loss,
and so are content with using gain to establish a reliable minimum loss figure to use in setting a sentence.
However, if gain can indeed exceed loss and the court
sets a sentence based on gain instead of on loss, the
court would be punishing the defendant, not for the
harm he had done anyone else, but for the benefit he
had obtained for himself
Assume two cases. Defendant A steals $ioo from Mr.
Victim, as a result ofwhich he somehow "gains" $i,ooo.
Defendant B simply steals $I,ooo from Mr. Victim.
The rule proposed by Commission staff would punish
Defendant A equally with Defendant B, even though
Defendant B stole ten times as much money from and
caused ten times as much economic harm to Mr. Victim.
It is difficult to identify a justification either in criminal
law theory, or in common sense, for such a result.
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